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Free Software Production as Critical Social Practice
1
 
 
Anne Barron, Law Department, London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
 
Abstract 
This article analyses the phenomenon of free and open source software (FOSS) in the 
light of Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello’s The New Spirit of Capitalism. It argues 
that collaborative FOSS production by volunteer software developers is a species of 
critical social practice in Boltanski and Chiapello’s sense: rooted in resistance to 
capitalist social relations, and yet also a source of values that justify the new routes to 
profitability associated with contemporary network capitalism. Advanced via 
collective projects that are sustained by hacker norms and privately-legislated 
‘copyleft’ law, the FOSS ethos is apparently antithetical to private property-based 
accumulation. Yet it can be shown to embody the ‘new spirit of capitalism’ in its most 
distilled form; moreover FOSS developers have instituted new forms of property and 
new modes of profit-creation around software that are in the process of being adapted 
for use in other economic sectors. Meanwhile, the private law constraints on profit-
seeking that have emerged from the FOSS movement are counteracting some of the 
social pathologies that accompany network capitalism only to consolidate others. The 
article concludes by identifying likely bases for a renewal of critique given these 
realities. 
 
Keywords: Copyleft, free software, immaterial labour, new spirit of capitalism, open 
source, reputational capital. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The term ‘hacker’ has come to have a pejorative connotation as a label for a 
malevolent system-breaker. Yet in computing circles it is a badge of honour 
(Nissenbaum, 2004, p.197),
2
 reserved for those who share an anti-authoritarian, anti-
bureaucratic approach to innovation, who value freedom of inquiry, and who are 
therefore opposed to all strategies oriented towards keeping the material and 
intellectual tools of innovation inaccessible to those with an interest in using them. 
Incubated in the research institutions that fostered the early development of 
computing in the 1960s, hacker culture became both more diffuse and more 
widespread with the development of the internet in the 1990s. It is now closely 
associated with the free software movement, but radiates out from there to encompass 
innovators in any field who share the ‘hacker attitude’ (Raymond, 2001a). Hackers 
see themselves not as vandals but as programming enthusiasts, committed to 
maximizing access to computer equipment and software, and to the information 
                                                 
1 This is a preprint of an article whose final and definitive form has been published in Economy and 
Society (2013) DOI: 10.1080/03085147.2013.791510 [copyright Taylor & Francis]. Economy and 
Society is available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/reso20/current 
2
 Participants in these circles tend to disapprove of the ‘malicious meddlers’ – whom they prefer to 
label as ‘crackers’ – that give hackers properly so called a bad name: see Raymond n.d.. The classic 
account of hacker values is still to be found in Levy, 1984. 
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necessary to improve these tools and innovate with them. Their ethos is organized 
around a faith in computing progress as the key to social progress, and it holds that 
sharing, openness, non-hierarchical decision-making and respect for technical 
excellence are essential conditions for continuing improvements in both dimensions. 
At the heart of the hacker identity, though, are experiences of the pure joy of 
computer programming, born of an intense curiosity about programming challenges 
and an enthusiasm for solving them well – that is, in ways that other hackers 
recognize and appreciate – typically in partnership with other programmers (see e.g. 
Sennett, 2008, p. 24-51; Coleman, 2013, Ch.3). A commitment to the value of 
community and collaboration is thus also associated with these hacker norms; indeed 
the most noteworthy feature of free software products is that they emerge from 
spontaneously-generated collective ‘projects’ on which many volunteers cooperate, 
within loosely structured groupings facilitated by the internet, to produce complex but 
nonetheless integrated artefacts that are freely available for all to use.  
 
The reason why these products are freely available for all to use is that the copyrights 
in them are licensed in ways that reverse the dominant meaning of private 
(intellectual) property as a right of exclusion. National copyright laws now invariably 
provide that software which is original to its author shall be protected by copyright,
3
 
and for the major commercial software producers in the US, the EU and elsewhere, 
licensing these copyrights on restrictive terms has become crucial to achieving ever 
more finely-tuned dominion over access to and use of code. By contrast, the free 
software strategy has been to transform the copyright licence into a charter of 
freedoms for software users. Some such licences – notably those based on the model 
General Public Licence (GPL) devised by free software pioneer Richard Stallman in 
the late 1980s – leverage software copyrights to propagate ‘software freedom’ norms 
beyond the immediate licensee.  Consequently, these ‘copyleft’ licences have been 
described as viral: the norms they contain reproduce themselves every time derivative 
works are created from licensed material and in turn licensed. Copyleft is thus itself 
an ingenious hack of copyright:  
 
Hacks … take advantage of characteristics of [a] system that may or may not 
have been obvious to the people who designed it…. To call Free Software a 
hack is to point out that it would be nothing without the existence of 
intellectual property law… (Kelty, 2008, p.182).  
 
Elsewhere (Barron, 2012, p.40) I have supported Christopher Kelty’s more general 
intuition about the free software movement: that its significance lies in its tendency to 
problematize the technical infrastructures underpinning today’s digitally-mediated 
public spheres (thereby drawing attention to the materiality of practices too often 
idealized as ‘purely’ communicative)4 and subject them to processes of public debate 
and re-making (Kelty, 2008, p.27-63). The questions structuring the present article, 
however, focus on the work that these processes involve for the movement’s 
participants:
 
What (aside from the general commitment just noted) mobilizes these 
individuals to engage – for no payment, and with no prospect of exclusively 
                                                 
3
 The World Trade Organization’s member States must so provide under Article 10 of the WTO’s 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (1994). 
4
 On the materiality of all forms of public association and political engagement, see generally Marres & 
Lezaun, 2011. 
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controlling the fruits of their efforts – in the labour of writing and maintaining 
computer code? How are their collective efforts coordinated? How do these 
mobilizing factors and forms of organization relate to the pursuit of profit by capitalist 
enterprises, in the software sector and beyond? The answers to these questions show 
that free software production is also intimately connected – though in complex and 
ambiguous ways – with the dynamics of contemporary capitalism. On the one hand, 
the movement emerged from a resistance to proprietary control of the electronic 
architectures on which capitalism increasingly relies, and an antagonism towards 
capitalist social relations that is reflected in practices and norms of inclusion, 
cooperation, volunteering and sharing. On the other hand, free software projects have 
been made to serve as laboratories for the development of organizational and 
managerial techniques tailored to a project-based capitalist economy, and the hacker 
ethos animating these projects has become distilled into a particularly pure form of 
the ‘spirit’ of this capitalism (Boltanski & Chiapello, 1999/2005). Inevitably, then, 
property relations have re-emerged in business models organized around ‘open’ 
innovation. Founded on mechanisms that curtail strategies of profiting from exclusive 
rights in one kind of intangible asset (authorial products), only to consolidate 
strategies of profiting from control of another (reputational capital), these relations 
institute social asymmetries that are in their turn underpinning new modalities of 
exploitation. At the same time, publicly-legislated copyright norms are reversed here 
only by privately-legislated ‘copyleft’ norms, which in turn rely on legal techniques 
that advance commodification processes rather than impeding them. 
 
 
1 Code, Copyright and Commerce 
 
In any history of the free software phenomenon, 1985 marks a critical juncture and 
Richard Stallman emerges as a central character. In 1984, Stallman was still 
associated with the Artificial Intelligence Laboratory at MIT, where over the previous 
decade he had established a formidable reputation as a brilliant programmer. 
Committed to the hacker principles that software should be freely shareable and that 
programmers should be able to build upon each other’s work, he opposed the creeping 
tendencies towards software propertization (the assertion of proprietary rights over 
software, such that source code could not be accessed and the distribution of modified 
versions was prohibited) that were becoming evident with the rise of the PC market 
and the emergence of firms specializing in the production of PC software products. 
Driven by these commitments and antipathies, Stallman had by 1984 embarked on the 
project of writing an operating system, dubbed ‘GNU’, which would be released as 
‘free’ software (Stallman, 2010, p.25-36). For Stallman, free software was defined by 
the core user freedoms that were already taken for granted within the hacker 
community: the freedoms to use and modify the software, and to make and distribute 
copies and modified versions. Software was not free if any of these freedoms was in 
practice unavailable because the user had no access to the program’s source code. (A 
program’s executable object code is effectively only readable by computers. Access to 
the human-readable source code is therefore a precondition of the easy analysis and 
modification of software.) Software was also not free if the user had to pay for, or 
even ask for, permission to exercise any of the essential freedoms in relation to either 
its source code or its executable code. It followed that proprietary software was not 
free: subject to certain exceptions, intellectual property (IP) law (including copyright 
law) requires licences to be obtained from a right-holder for any use falling within the 
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scope of the right-holder’s exclusive rights, usually in return for royalties. Yet 
Stallman saw no contradiction between his free software definition and charging for 
copies of software programs: indeed his practice had always been to make copies of 
his code available to anyone who requested them – for a price but with no restrictions 
on use – and to invite feedback from users. In October 1985, he sought to 
institutionalize this process in relation to his GNU project, setting up the Free 
Software Foundation (FSF) to coordinate a growing band of follower-volunteers to 
write GNU code, distribute copies and incorporate suggested modifications.  
 
In a context of legislative changes and judicial rulings consistently favouring the 
demands of proprietary software producers for strong IP protection,
5
 the FSF had to 
find ways to advance its philosophy of software freedom from within a legal 
framework that seemed fundamentally at odds with that philosophy. One way was to 
encourage volunteer programmers to donate their software (with its source code) to 
the public domain, thereby renouncing their copyrights altogether. Another was to 
encourage programmers to use their copyrights to give legal effect to free software 
norms by releasing their software to the public subject to permissive general licences 
(i.e. licences granting all prospective users all of the essential software freedoms, for 
no royalty). From a starting point of fundamental opposition to the idea that 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) could subsist in software, the former was the 
preferable strategy, but neither method of release could ensure that donated or 
licensed software remained free for users downstream of the first recipient. In 
donating code to the public domain, the donor disclaims any copyright in it, and in so 
doing pledges to relinquish the legal leverage s/he would otherwise have had over 
users of it by virtue of that copyright. However it remains possible for anyone else to 
take the donated material, add enough to it to create something that qualifies as an 
original work for the purposes of copyright law, claim copyright in that derivative 
(but ‘original’ in the legal sense)6 work, and thereafter exercise that copyright in 
conventionally restrictive ways. The same applies to permissively licensed code.  
 
To forestall this re-propertization of code acquired as free software, Stallman devised 
an ingenious strategy for licensing software copyrights so as to guarantee that the 
licensed software and any derivatives remained free for all users, not just the 
immediate licensee. The term ‘copyleft’ reflects the recursive dimension of this 
strategy, which was adopted by other free software activists from the late 1980s once 
a template copyleft licence drafted by Stallman and others had been made available 
for general use as the General Public License.
7
 Licences based upon the GPL are non-
exclusive, perpetual (i.e. subsisting for the duration of the copyright in the licensed 
work unless breached by the licensee), applicable worldwide, and royalty-free. They 
permit any user to run, copy and modify the licensed software: the essential freedoms 
                                                 
5
 In 1980, the US Congress amended the 1976 Copyright Act to protect computer programs (Pub. L. 
96-517, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028, 12 December 12, 1980, amending the US Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §101 
and §117). In 1981, the US Supreme Court definitively established computer programs’ eligibility for 
patent protection (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981)). 
6
 In general, the requirement of originality in national copyright laws demands no more than a non-
mechanical and non-trivial exercise of independent skill and judgment in the production of a work 
(Judge & Gervais, 2010). 
7
 The current version of the GPL is available at http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html  
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that define free software according to the FSF.
8
 GPL-based licences also permit 
verbatim copies and modified versions of the licensed software to be ‘conveyed’ 
(propagated in a way that enables others to make or receive copies) subject to certain 
conditions, notably that source code be made available as well; there is no restriction 
on charging for copies, support services or warranty protection. Where modified 
versions are conveyed, the derivative work must identify the modifier and indicate 
when the changes were made. Most controversially, the GPL’s copyleft clause 
stipulates that such downstream products must also be licensed under the same (GPL) 
terms. Effectively, then, a GPL-based licence is a legal mechanism for ensuring that 
any software which is acquired as, derived from, or intermingled with free software 
can only itself be distributed to other parties as free software: it imposes a regime of 
reciprocal sharing. 
The keys to understanding free software development are to be found not only in 
licences that liberate individuals to use and modify code as they wish for their own 
purposes, but also in those hacker norms that encourage individuals to participate 
gratis in collective projects with a view to producing integrated products 
collaboratively. A project is typically initiated by posting a first version of a software 
product to a host website
9
 and inviting users/developers to upload additions or 
modifications – all under permissive general licences such as the GPL. Where 
additions or modifications are accepted, the project’s initiators incorporate them and 
re-post the new version, thereby launching another phase of the same process. The 
best known product of this process is undoubtedly still the GNU/Linux operating 
system, so called because it combines an operating system kernel named Linux with 
GNU operating system tools. Initiated by Linus Torvalds (then a computer science 
student at Helsinki University) in 1991, it grew rapidly with the explosive growth of 
internet use from the 1990s, and as it became clear that its decentralized development 
model was yielding an operating system that was at least as good as, if not technically 
superior to, the available proprietary equivalents, it increasingly became the focus of 
efforts to commercialize it. By the mid-1990s, companies such as Red Hat and 
Caldera were building profitable businesses out of packaging the components of the 
system onto CDs or downloadable files, and/or offering technical support and 
customization to its users.  
Considered in terms of conventional economic analysis of the bases of individual and 
collective action and social coordination, the technical and commercial success of 
GNU/Linux was unexpected. Why were good programmers choosing to allocate time 
and energy to a project for which they knew they would not be compensated and on 
which they knew others would free-ride? Once they did commit themselves, how 
were the combined efforts of thousands of geographically dispersed individuals able 
to yield functioning products in the absence of the coordinating mechanisms typical of 
firms (hierarchical chains of managerial command) or markets (contracts for 
services)? In 1997 Eric Raymond, a free software developer and writer on hacker 
culture, explained these ‘miracles’ (Raymond, 2001b, p.21-22) as arising from 
                                                 
8
 The current definition of free software, as codified by the FSF, is available at 
http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.html. The FSF’s account of how “free software,” “copylefted 
software” and other categories of software relate to each other is available at 
http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/categories.html. 
9
 See e.g. http://sourceforge.net/ and http://freshmeat.net/ 
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straightforwardly utility-maximizing behaviour by individuals, organized by reference 
to a few basic principles. Hackers, he argued, are no less self-interested than 
innovators in any other field but, for them, the prospects of ego-satisfaction and peer 
recognition are more powerful drivers of creative effort than the hope of direct 
monetary reward. The interactions constituting the Linux project amounted in effect 
to a market in these intangible goods, whereby intellectual outputs (chunks of code) 
were exchanged, not for royalties, but for acclaim and credibility. The project’s “great 
babbling bazaar of differing agendas and approaches” (ibid.) structured this market by 
bringing together a good initial software design with a modular structure, permissive 
licensing, effective use of the internet to harness the attention and brainpower of a 
globally distributed talent pool, the cooperative customs and ‘play drive’ native to 
hacker culture, and a leader with the programming skills to judge the quality of 
others’ contributions to the project and the communication skills to “keep his 
hacker/users constantly stimulated and rewarded” (ibid., p.30). The result was “a self-
correcting spontaneous order more elaborate and efficient than any amount of central 
planning could have achieved” (ibid., p.52). By “maximiz[ing] the number of person-
hours thrown at debugging and development” (ibid., p.30), the Linux project had 
incubated a highly efficient process for identifying and fixing bugs with which the 
monoliths of the proprietary software world could not compete. 
The impact of Raymond’s intervention on the free software movement and its 
relationship with the commercial software sector was immense. Citing Raymond’s 
essay as an influence on its decision, Netscape – a proprietary firm then locked into 
battle with Microsoft for control of the Web browser market – released the source 
code of its browser on the internet in 1998 under a permissive general licence (lacking 
a copyleft clause). Its aim was to attract volunteers to work on the development of the 
browser as a collective project. Later that year, tensions that had been brewing within 
the free software movement over the movement’s relationship with the proprietary 
software sector finally resulted in a split. Disaffected by what they perceived to be the 
dogmatism of Stallman’s free software philosophy, self-styled ‘pragmatists’ within 
the movement – led by Raymond and Bruce Perens – launched the Open Source 
Initiative. This had the avowed aim of “dump[ing] the moralizing and confrontational 
attitude that had been associated with ‘free software’ in the past and sell[ing] the idea 
[of collaborative non-proprietary software development] strictly on the same 
pragmatic, business-case grounds that had motivated Netscape” (Open Source 
Initiative n.d.). Proponents of what was now called ‘open source’ software (as distinct 
from ‘free’ software10) then began actively to court venture capitalists and large 
corporations, pleading the technical superiority and lower cost of software produced 
on the basis of openness and sharing, but eschewing a rigid adherence to ‘copyleftist’ 
ideology. Ever since, open source proponents have formed the numerically dominant 
camp within what is now generally referred to as the ‘free and open source software’ 
(FOSS) movement, and Raymond is widely regarded as the founding father and chief 
                                                 
10
 The ‘open source definition’ can be found at http://www.opensource.org. Despite the rift, there 
remains a large degree of consensus between the free software and open source software camps about 
how software development should proceed – hence the emergence of the ‘FOSS’ label to designate this 
common ground. All agree that permissive licensing is crucial, although OS proponents are agnostic 
about the concept of copyleft. 
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spokesperson of this branch of the movement – as important to its self-understanding 
as Stallman has been to that of the free software stem.
11
 
For present purposes, the most noteworthy result of the FS/OS split was that the free 
software philosophy became transformed in the eyes of investors into nothing more 
than another business model: the ‘open source’ model. From this point on, a swelling 
chorus of voices – including those of Linus Torvalds, the technology publishing group 
O’Reilly Media, influential publications such as Wired magazine, the CEOs of FOSS 
distribution firms, and a growing band of academic researchers – joined Raymond’s 
in offering plausible accounts of the ‘success of open source’12 that explained the 
phenomenon of open innovation in the idiom of conventional economic analysis. 
Research in the economics of innovation was called upon to explain why permissive 
licensing strategies and hacker norms are in fact more efficient mechanisms for 
structuring software development than IPR-based exclusion. The propensity of 
exclusive IPRs to throttle product development in the information industries, or to 
absorb capital that might otherwise be productively deployed elsewhere, is well 
documented in this literature (see e.g. Heller, 1998; 2008). By opening up access to 
the intangible raw materials of innovation – source code, in the software development 
context – permissive licensing, it is said, can avert the ‘tragedy’ of enclosure,13 
forestalling the possibility of hold-ups by the owners of monopoly rights and 
obviating the need to duplicate others’ efforts. Further, free-riding – using FOSS code 
but contributing nothing to its development – has been characterized as capable in fact 
of enhancing its value: by causing it to become a de facto standard, the network 
effects (positive externalities) generated by free-riding on FOSS products can increase 
the market share of the corresponding commercial distributions. 
A more far-reaching set of implications of the FOSS development model has emerged 
from the organizational and management science literatures on FOSS. Researchers in 
these fields have devised economistic explanations for the motivations that drive 
voluntary participation in FOSS projects and the mechanisms by which participants’ 
contributions are coordinated. Echoing and expanding on Raymond’s observations, 
‘incentives’ to participation have been said to include opportunities to solve personal 
or business IT problems, hone skills, and earn reputational benefits that can be cashed 
out in the form of job offers, access to venture capital and the ability to attract other 
excellent programmers as collaborators (see e.g. Tirole & Lerner, 2002; von Hippel & 
von Krogh, 2003; Gambardella & Hall, 2006; Roberts, Hann, & Slaughter, 2006; 
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 For an exploration of Raymond’s role in the FOSS movement, see Berry, 2008, Ch.5.  
12
 Steven Weber commences his study of that name with the remark that “[o]pen source code does not 
obliterate profit, capitalism, or intellectual property rights. Companies and individuals are creating 
intellectual products and making money from open source software code, while inventing new business 
models and notions about property along the way….” (Weber, 2004, p.3). Torvalds has insisted that far 
from being a profit-killing ‘socialist’ experiment, “open source is what makes capitalism in software 
possible [by undoing ‘feudal’ IP-based monopolies and barriers to entry]” (Torvalds, quoted in 
Tapscott & Williams, 2008, p.92). Similar views are reported by the ‘geeks’ (FOSS developers and 
activists) that were the focus of Kelty’s research (Kelty, 2008, esp. Ch.2). See also Young, 1999. 
13
 Institutional economists have charged Garret Hardin’s famous fable about the tragedy of the 
commons (Hardin, 1968) with ignoring the inefficiencies that can arise from private property, and the 
efficiency gains linked with the institutions that communities develop to manage common pool 
resources (see e.g. Ostrom, 1990). For interpretations of FOSS communities as engaged in the 
management of common pool resources, see O’Mahony, 2003; van Wendel de Joode, 2005 and 
Schweik & English, 2012). 
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Shah, 2006). Another driver of participation is said to be the possibilities for self-
expression (or simply fun) that coding offers. Unlike developers working for 
proprietary software enterprises, FOSS developers can choose what problems to work 
on, and how, and their work is available for their peers to see, celebrate and (most 
gratifying of all) to use. Steven Weber identifies as their major motivation the simple 
desire to create code that not only functions to achieve particular technical goals but is 
openly affirmed as functioning ‘elegantly’ (Weber, 2004, p.136). The websites that 
host FOSS software and projects are said to play an important role here: they enable 
developers to display their talents, debate the merits of each other’s work and give or 
withhold recognition. 
 
How the distributed labour invested by the contributors to FOSS projects is 
coordinated has proved to be more difficult for organizational and management 
scientists to fathom. On one level the internet is seen as part of the solution to this 
problem, in that it enables geographically dispersed participants to communicate 
easily, instantaneously and cheaply. On another level the vigorous discussion it 
enables is seen as increasing the likelihood of conflicts between contributors – e.g. 
over the criteria informing assessments of a contribution’s ‘elegance’, over how 
contributions should be attributed, and over when defecting from a project to launch a 
competing one (‘forking’) is legitimate (Weber, 2004, p.89). Yet researchers report 
that the process of project development is not in fact anarchic.
14
 Failure to comply 
with norms or decisions that are widely perceived within the community to be 
authoritative are sanctioned, albeit in informal ways – ranging from ‘flaming’ (public 
condemnation) to shunning (refusals to cooperate with the wrongdoer thereafter) – but 
more importantly, the impact of non-compliance is minimized in advance by 
strategies of project modularization: “[a] well designed program has modules whose 
design limits interaction between modules” (Tuomi, 2002, p.175; see also Baldwin & 
Clark, 2006) such that if one module becomes beset by irresolvable conflicts the 
others can proceed regardless. Further, most conflicts do prove amenable to 
resolution, invariably by recourse to generally recognized, albeit uncodified, norms 
establishing quality standards organized around notions of technical efficacy; and 
where these standards prove inconclusive, conventions have emerged to determine 
where ultimate decision-making authority resides. Even in those projects that are 
overseen by formal governance institutions, authority on issues of technical design 
generally rests with those who have earned the respect of their fellow programmers as 
a result of the technical merits of their programming work, their responsiveness to the 
contributions and comments of others, and their ability to set achievable goals for the 
project (Weber, 2004, p.167-168). Significantly, Eric Raymond regards these 
conventions as rooted in a conception of ownership that can be characterized as “an 
abstraction of [the] territoriality” (Raymond, 2001b, p.98) underlying land claims 
under Anglo-American common law. Ownership in this customary sense is regarded 
as legitimately acquired in one of three ways: by founding, and remaining actively 
engaged in the development of, the project; by transfer (via explicit public 
declaration) from the founder (or from one of his ‘successors in title’); and by a 
community-supported takeover of an abandoned project (ibid., p.74-5). Viewed in this 
way, hacker norms contest liberal-legal conceptions of the bases of property rights 
(investment, alienation and adverse possession) only to replicate them at a deeper 
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 For varying explanations, see e.g. Tuomi, 2002; O’Mahony & Ferraro, 2007; Coleman, 2013, Ch.4. 
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level. Thus entitlements to fork, or approve changes to, a project are in fact held 
exclusively by those who are accepted by the community of contributors as the 
project’s legitimate owners (ibid., p.73).  
 
 
2 Understanding FOSS  
 
Thus far, two powerful – but, I will argue, ultimately unsatisfactory – frameworks 
have emerged for understanding the relations between FOSS, capitalism and the 
critique of capitalism. One is Manuel Castells’s sociology of the ‘information age’, 
connecting transformations in computing and communications in the 1970s to broader 
socio-economic changes, and ultimately to the emergence of a ‘network’ society to 
which information flows are central. Volume One of Castells’s influential trilogy on 
these themes (first published between 1996 and 1998)  focused on the technological 
changes and forms of economic restructuring involved with what Castells 
characterised as a shift from an ‘industrial’ to an ‘informational’ mode of capitalist 
development.
15
 The Rise of the Network Society (Castells, 2000) represented this shift 
as exemplifying two competing trajectories. The more firmly established of the two, 
Castells argued, deployed new information and communications technologies (ICTs) 
towards the end of short-term profitability and in ways that left old economic power 
structures intact – i.e. “to save labour, to subdue unions, and to trim costs, rather than 
to improve quality or to enhance productivity by means other than downsizing” 
(Castells, 2000, p.265). Yet Castells also seemed to discern another tendency, more 
potential than actual but nonetheless immanent within the most advanced sectors of 
informational capitalist economies by the mid-1990s. Propelling this trajectory were 
innovative ‘network enterprises’ that were profitable yet non-hierarchical and 
harnessed ICTs to support organizational forms and cultures that privileged worker 
autonomy and consumer engagement; Castells later appeared to identify ‘open source’ 
enterprises as exemplary of this ‘new’ economy gestating within the old (Castells, 
2004, p.158). If fully unleashed, his analysis suggested, the values sustaining these 
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 Although much of Castells’s terminology carries traces of his earlier structuralist Marxist leanings, it 
also echoes theorists of post-industrialism such as Daniel Bell, who effectively separated out what 
Marx had wedded together in the concept of the mode of production – i.e. ‘forces’ and ‘relations’ of 
production (Harvey, 2006, p. 25, Ch.4; cf. Cohen, 1978, Ch.II) – and redefined the former as purely 
technological forces that could in themselves be regarded as the main levers of social change (Bell, 
1973). Castells has accordingly insisted on an analytical distinction between capitalism as a mode of 
economic production and informationalism as a mode of economic development. A mode of 
production is organized on the basis of a structural principle determining how any unconsumed surplus 
arising from human action on nature is controlled (Castells, 2000, p.15-16). The structural principle of 
the capitalist mode of production is the maximization of profit, which involves a perpetual growth in 
the proportion of the social surplus that is controlled by the capitalist class on the basis of private 
ownership of the means of production. A mode of development is constituted of the technological 
arrangements by which a surplus is generated: these can be more or less productive and so can vary in 
the level and quality of surplus that they yield (ibid., p.16). Each mode of development, Castells has 
claimed, is centrally defined by the elements that are fundamental in fostering productivity. These are 
labour and natural resources in the agrarian mode of development, energy and machines in the 
industrial mode of development, and technologies of information processing, knowledge generation 
and symbol communication in the informational mode of development (ibid., p.17). A ‘technological 
paradigm’ is a conceptual model of how particular technologies relate to each other so that their 
performance may be optimized: it guides the synergetic integration of otherwise disparate technologies 
and directs their future trajectories (Castells, 2001, p. 160-1). ‘Informationalism’ is the technological 
paradigm that underpins the informational mode of capitalist development. 
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enterprises could lead to the emergence of a network economy in the best sense: 
globally integrated (though also decentralized and differentiated), fully inclusive 
(capable of engaging every human mind as a direct productive force (Castells, 2000, 
p.31)), and therefore marked by sustained growth, enhanced experiences of work, low 
unemployment and higher living standards everywhere.  
 
Of particular interest in the present context is that Castells eventually came to see 
each of these trajectories as linked with a distinct ‘spirit’ of informational 
capitalism.
16
 In Max Weber’s famous formulation, the spirit of capitalism is the set of 
values motivating action conducive to capital accumulation: Weber himself saw these 
values as organized around a ‘Protestant’ conception of work as a vocation to be 
pursued with a dogged attention to duty (Weber, 1905/2001). In The Hacker Ethic 
and the Spirit of the Information Age (Himanen, 2001), Castells’s collaborator Pekka 
Himanen identified two competing spirits of the informational capitalism whose 
contradictions Castells had already mapped in The Rise of the Network Society. The 
dominant one, Himanen argued, is directly descended from the Protestant ethic, 
though re-formulated for the digital age. It comprises an implacable orientation 
towards the achievement of calculable goals, in relation to which all available time 
must be optimized and all available energy expended: individuals and enterprises that 
operate in accordance with this ethic will function like the very computers they 
ostensibly program. Opposed to this is the hacker ethic, organized around a 
conception of work as a passion to be realized in community with others, and oriented 
towards “the imaginative use of one’s own abilities … and the giving to the world of a 
genuinely valuable new contribution” (Himanen, 2001, p.141). In endorsing this 
alternative spirit of informationalism (Castells, 2001, p.167), Castells seemed to 
affirm the centrality of the hacker ethos to the incarnation of the new, improved 
capitalism already heralded in The Rise of the Network Society. Overall, however, his 
work on this theme suggests a commitment to a version of technological determinism 
(Castells, 2000, p.257),
17
 evident for example in the suggestion that although hackers 
may have initiated the IT revolution underlying ‘the rise of the network society’, they 
never controlled its subsequent development because “once programmed [by social 
actors], information networks, powered by information technology, impose their 
structural logic on their human components” (Castells, 2001, p.167). In short, 
although Castells intuited that the hacker ethos could exert some critical traction on 
the workings of the capitalist system, he ultimately represented it as a function of the 
‘technological paradigm’ currently underpinning that system: ‘informationalism’.  
 
Ostensibly opposed to all forms of determinism is another influential perspective on 
FOSS, one also propelled to contemporary prominence by a widely-read trilogy 
(Hardt & Negri, 2001; 2006; 2009). For the ‘autonomist’ Marxist – arguably better 
described as post-Marxist – internet theorists who take their bearings from the work 
of Antonio Negri, global electronic communications environments are exemplary sites 
of the ‘immaterial’ (cognitive and cultural) labour on which profits increasingly 
depend under the post-Fordist conditions that characterize advanced capitalist 
economies. The central theme of this literature, however, is that the process by which 
                                                 
16
 For his first – and somewhat cryptic – effort to specify the culture, or ethical foundation, of 
informational capitalism see Castells, 2000, p.210-215.  
17
 On Castells’s technological determinism, see Van Dijk, 1999. It should be said that Castells himself 
has consistently resisted this characterization: see e.g. Castells, 1997.  
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surplus value is extracted from labour is fundamentally contested. Labour in general, 
it is said, exceeds all attempts by capital to organize it: it manifests a capacity for 
insurgency that can transform instruments of capitalist exploitation into resources for 
opposition, and in ways that are autonomous of political parties, unions and the like. 
Immaterial labour has a particular potential for autonomous self-organization because, 
valorizing itself in spontaneously generated cooperative networks, it does not need to 
be activated and orchestrated by capital in order to become productive. Some 
autonomist writers have explored how this assumed potential manifests itself online 
(e.g. Terranova, 2000 and 2004, Ch.3; Dyer-Witheford, 2005). Drawing on this 
literature, Johan Söderberg has characterized FOSS projects as experiments in 
‘hacking capitalism’: as showing how the knowledge workers of the computer world 
can self-organize resistance to capitalist control of software production, and co-create 
alternatives to the infrastructures and networks on which capitalist exploitation in 
general relies (Söderberg, 2008). On Söderberg’s account, then, the libertarianism 
often avowed by FOSS participants can be dismissed as epiphenomenal. Viewed 
objectively – that is, in terms of what is necessarily presupposed by the activity 
(‘hacking as a verb’) rather than by reference to what its practitioners (‘hackers as a 
noun’) subjectively consider themselves to be doing when engaged in it (ibid., p.5) – 
FOSS development represents a radical critique of capitalism that is oriented towards 
its supersession, not merely (as on Castells’s account) its repair or improvement. 
Being open in principle to all who wish to participate, FOSS projects undermine the 
social division of labour and give power over the trajectory of technological change to 
the people. Being voluntarily undertaken and collectively managed, they are premised 
on a rejection of the wage relation and the capitalist organization of the labour 
process. Being informed by an antipathy to private property-based exclusion, the 
method by which their products are circulated is incompatible with the commodity 
form. Above all, FOSS development proceeds from the drive to produce for the sheer 
joy of it, and to share one’s creations freely with others. It thereby advances a 
conception of labour as a form of play, guided by an aesthetic motivation quite 
opposed to the urge to use labour-power as a means of expanding capital: the aim of 
creating beautiful artefacts (here, computer programs) as ends in themselves.  
 
Söderberg’s account of FOSS production as critical social practice is provocative and 
insightful, and it has informed the present account in numerous ways. Yet his 
‘discovery’ of the real meaning (anti-capitalist struggle) underlying the subjective 
meaning (pro-capitalist enthusiasm) most participants ascribe to their involvement in 
FOSS projects reveals a problem that characterizes autonomist writing in general. If 
(as the commercialization of FOSS suggests) capitalism requires the very practices 
that are supposed to manifest “a kind of spontaneous and elementary communism” 
(Hardt & Negri, 2001, p.294), and if the meanings the agents of these practices give to 
them are irrelevant, how is it possible to distinguish evidence of co-optation from 
evidence of contestation – or a resurgent capitalism from an emergent communism? 
The same practices seem to lend themselves to radically opposed interpretations, and 
autonomism offers no principled criteria by which to decide between these (Gill & 
Pratt, 2008, p.19). Further, if Castells’s structuralist representation of hackers seems 
mechanistic, the autonomist idea that they form the vanguard of a labouring 
‘multitude’ – ‘spontaneously’ resisting or routing around capitalism – is positively 
mysterious. Conceptualized by Hardt and Negri as defining a global subject of 
revolutionary insurrection, the category of the multitude remains a highly abstract and 
metaphysical one for which no empirical warrant can be found (Shapiro, 2004). 
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Consequently, autonomism too ultimately marginalizes human volition, in this 
instance because it represents the actions and intentions of human beings as mere 
symptoms of transcendent dynamics that lie beyond their comprehension and control. 
 
The premise of what follows is that Castells’s and Söderberg’s insights about the 
relationship between FOSS, capitalism and the critique of capitalism are best read in 
the light of Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello’s epic study of the business culture 
associated with the network economy, The New Spirit of Capitalism (first published in 
France in 1999). While acknowledging that capitalism constitutes a system with its 
own logic and laws, Boltanski and Chiapello nonetheless seek to integrate into their 
account of its workings the critiques that human actors direct at it (Boltanski & 
Chiapello, 2005, xviii). Critiques of capitalism, they argue, have historically taken 
two general forms: ‘artistic’ critiques (originally stemming from nineteenth century 
bohemianism) denounce capitalism as requiring forms of life that are inauthentic and 
oppressive; ‘social’ critiques (long associated with the traditional labour movement) 
condemn it as immiserating and corrosive of social solidarity. The central thesis of 
The New Spirit of Capitalism, however, is that these critiques are always entwined 
with capitalism even as they oppose it, and that this entwinement is manifested in the 
‘spirits’ that have accompanied successive phases of capitalist accumulation from the 
late nineteenth century onwards. Since each spirit of capitalism takes shape by co-
opting what resists capitalism, it must restrain the accumulation process as well as 
mobilizing support for it: more particularly, it must represent the forms of life that are 
linked with the phase of capitalism to which it corresponds as exciting for individuals 
(thereby accommodating the artistic critique), but also as guaranteeing individuals 
security and conducing to the common good of society as a whole (thereby addressing 
the social critique). To these ends, each spirit of capitalism needs mechanisms for its 
own concretization: the values it advances must be “inscribed in institutions, bound 
up with actions, and hence anchored in reality” (ibid., p.3) – not least by legal rules 
and other less codified measures such as particular management techniques and 
organizational arrangements within and between enterprises (ibid., p.399-400).  
 
Parts 3 and 4 below seek to show that the FOSS ethos has become distilled into a 
particularly pure form of the ‘new’ spirit of Boltanski and Chiapello’s title. The latter 
is tailored to a post-Fordist regime of accumulation, arranged around “lean firms 
working as networks with a multitude of participants, organizing work in the form of 
teams or projects, intent on customer satisfaction, and a general mobilization of 
workers thanks to their leaders’ vision” (ibid., p.73, emphasis in original). The spirit 
of this phase of capitalism privileges the bohemian qualities that generate and sustain 
the projects on which profitability now depends – qualities such as creativity, 
openness, informality, adaptability, conviviality, charisma – and it celebrates the 
‘connexionist’ form of life (a life of “contacts [and] chance encounters” (ibid., p.312)) 
that the cultivation of these qualities entails. In a project-based capitalist order, adept 
connexionists can find both excitement and security in their portfolios of projects, 
accumulating (social, reputational, informational and ultimately monetary) capital as 
they segue nimbly from one project to another. Yet their success, Boltanski and 
Chiapello argue, depends on a form of exploitation that is specific to network 
capitalism: not only are some more mobile than others, but the immobility of some is 
necessary to the mobility of others (ibid., p.362). The bad citizens of network 
capitalism (‘networkers’) use mobility differentials opportunistically to expand their 
own networks and reap the benefits yielded by their connections at the expense of 
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others who have helped to create them. The true exemplars of the spirit of network 
capitalism are its good citizens, connexionists who seek to advance the common good 
by compensating for mobility differentials. These ‘network-extenders’ share their 
connections and the resources yielded by these, and foster the potential of everyone 
linked into their networks at the same time as they cultivate their own. FOSS 
developers, I argue below, are archetypal network-extenders; more particularly, they 
have devised norms and mechanisms that institutionalize the network-extender’s 
implicit code of behaviour, thereby ‘anchoring the new spirit of capitalism in reality’ 
in uniquely effective ways. Yet these same norms and mechanisms, I suggest, are also 
embedding new modalities of control over both production and consumption, and 
extending commodification processes rather than curtailing them. Further, they are 
proving insufficiently robust to counteract the opportunistic networking that in fact 
sustains the new economy.  
 
 
3 FOSS and the New Spirit of Capitalism 
  
In Boltanski and Chiapello’s terms, Richard Stallman’s early crusade for free software 
can be seen as having been fuelled by both an artistic and a social critique of 
capitalism. Stallman opposed software propertization on the ground that it was 
producing attitudes and orientations fundamentally at odds with the patterns of 
collaborative code-writing that had emerged organically among programmers before 
commercial imperatives changed the rules of the software development game, and 
that it was suppressing programmers’ ‘natural’ tendencies to borrow from each other 
in the exercise of their own creativity (Williams, 2002, Ch.1). He lamented the 
passing of what to him was an intensely enjoyable decade of playful exploration, 
alongside fellow programmers at the AI Lab who shared the hacker ethos, of the new 
possibilities opened up by computing in the 1970s. He resented the economic forces 
and management practices that lured hackers into the employ of proprietary firms and 
imposed unethical contractual (especially trade secrecy) obligations and ‘ugly’ 
programming conventions on them. He particularly disdained the passivity to which 
proprietary strategies subjected software consumers, by preventing them from 
adapting software to their own ends and thereby customizing their own computer 
equipment, and keeping them locked into dependency on producers (Moody, 2001, 
Ch. 2). And he saw the freedoms to participate in, and benefit from the fruits of, 
collaborative programming as important not only for individuals but for society as a 
whole, “because they promote social solidarity – that is, sharing and cooperation” 
(Stallman, 2010, p.83). 
 
Nonetheless, it is clear from the trajectory mapped in Part 1 above that although the 
free software movement originated in an antipathy to the proprietary software sector, 
the ‘FOSS’ movement has since become co-opted as an adjunct to that sector. The 
argument of the present Part is that this outcome is unsurprising when considered in 
relation to Boltanski and Chiapello’s account of the associations between capitalism 
and its critiques. From the end of the 1990s onwards, business analysts and 
organization theorists were able (thanks in particular to the interventions of Eric 
Raymond, Bruce Perens and Linus Torvalds) to interpret the avowedly 
confrontational ‘free software’ movement as a branch of a fundamentally business-
friendly ‘open source’ movement; consequently, they could – and, as Part 1 shows, 
did – subsume the former within the latter (now dubbed the ‘free and open source’, or 
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simply ‘open source’, movement), and read the ‘FOSS’ ethos as a set of instructions 
for managing production in every sector of a connexionist market economy. So 
construed, FOSS projects have demonstrated the viability of the project form as a 
mode of coordinating persons, intangible assets and material arrangements towards 
the end of capital accumulation, while the norms that hold these projects together 
have provided the blueprint for a new spirit of capitalism adapted to post-Fordist 
conditions – a spirit that takes the free software movement’s critiques of capitalism as 
its very ingredients. These points are elaborated briefly in what follows; Part 4 
identifies likely bases for a renewal of critique given these realities. 
 
Boltanski and Chiapello observe that what distinguishes projects from other modes of 
action coordination is that they temporarily assemble disparate actors within a 
network, “stabilizing certain connections and making them irreversible” (Boltanski & 
Chiapello, 2005, p.105) while they last, and putting in place more enduring links “that 
will be put on hold while remaining available” (ibid., p.104) after they have come to 
an end. In this way, projects crystallize relatively durable ‘forms’ – subjects, objects, 
goals, patterns of production and accumulation of value – that would otherwise be 
dissipated through the networks constituting social and economic life; at the same 
time, their transience and mutability render them perfectly adapted to a network logic 
(ibid., p.111). In effect, FOSS initiatives have served as laboratories for the 
development of a ‘projective’ grammar of social organization that transcends 
capitalism yet is also amenable to being tailored to its demands. In particular, by 
taking full advantage of digital networks, these initiatives are taken to have shown 
how projects can have a global reach and involve many dispersed participants without 
disintegrating or losing focus. Their modular arrangement, together with the 
meritocratic norms of conflict resolution that proceed from hacker culture, are seen as 
facilitating virtually horizontal decision-making structures that allow input by any 
participant with relevant expertise. A particular style of leadership is emphasized as 
crucial to coordinating this input and ensuring its quality. Central to this style is open 
communication and creativity (though not in the manner of the solitary Romantic 
genius – FOSS leaders are seen as recombining what they find in the way rather than 
creating from nothing, and distributing responsibility for innovation through the 
network rather than monopolizing it themselves); most importantly, FOSS projects 
are taken to show that effective ‘team’ leadership requires charisma: the ability to 
mobilize actors over whom one has no formal power towards a project’s satisfactory 
completion depends on enthusing them with one’s vision (Giuri, Rullani, & Torrisi, 
2008).  
 
FOSS projects thus exemplify the very approach to organization and management that 
business analysts have, since the mid-1990s, perceived as crucial to profitability in a 
reticular economy (on ‘visionary’ leadership generally, for example, see Bennis & 
Biederman, 1998). Yet two features mark them out as distinctive relative to 
straightforwardly commercial cooperative ventures. The first is the heavy 
involvement within them of unpaid volunteers. The second is the conception of 
property that animates them: those who own the IPRs in FOSS project outputs see 
their exercise of these rights as governed by their role as ‘stewards’ of the project 
(O’Mahony, 2005) and guardians of its constitutive norms of sharing and 
collaboration. In Boltanski and Chiapello’s terms, however, these non-market and 
anti-exclusionary aspects of the FOSS phenomenon are best regarded, not as 
positioning FOSS beyond the accumulation imperative altogether, but as expressing 
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variants of (respectively) the artistic and the social critiques that, as such, were ripe 
for incorporation within the new spirit of “leftist” capitalism (Boltanski & Chiapello, 
2005, p. 202) – a laid-back, cool capitalism – that was beginning to emerge in the 
1990s.  
 
The artistic critique embedded in the hacker ethos has proved particularly easy to 
assimilate because it is readable as a development of the themes of the 1960s counter-
culture, themes that had themselves been invoked in the 1980s to justify the upheavals 
consequent upon the economic shifts of the 1970s: organizational restructuring, 
‘flexible specialization’, labour casualization, and the commodification of objects and 
services (including intellectual/creative objects and services) that had previously 
circulated beyond the market. In so far as these changes were ‘sold’ to those affected 
on the basis that both production and consumption would thereby become occasions 
for experiences of autonomy, personal development, creativity and authentic human 
relations, the erosion of the production/consumption divide was bound eventually to 
seem both natural and inevitable. This erosion is what FOSS development has 
primarily come to represent. As a form of voluntary and self-organizing collaborative 
endeavour that participants experience as pleasurable but that can also be seen to yield 
socially useful (and saleable) outputs, it erases completely the lines between work and 
play (or art), production networks and friendship networks, economic exchange and 
social interaction. From the hacker-participant’s perspective, this erasure may well be 
experienced as the subsumption of the first term of each of these poles into the 
second. But from the business strategist’s perspective, the lesson taught by the 
hacker’s participation has been that exactly the reverse is possible: not that all labour 
can become play, but that all play can become labour. 
 
Admittedly, the social critique presupposed by the hacker norms governing FOSS 
development has proved more difficult for capitalist enterprises to absorb. These 
norms extol good (in Boltanski and Chiapello’s terms, network-extending) behavior 
that is conducive to the alleviation of inequality and the building of solidarity, and 
condemn ‘evil’ (networking) behavior that is self-regarding and opportunistic. By 
providing that anyone may contribute to a FOSS project, they open up prospects of 
developing skills and benefiting in other ways from connections with other 
programmers. Permissive licensing ensures that all may help themselves to FOSS 
outputs, thereby combating the forms of exclusion and asymmetry that are bound up 
with the conventional exercise of IPRs.
18
 Copyleft clauses in permissive licences are 
designed to give legal force to the norm that no one may seek to re-create IP-based 
asymmetries in relation to code first licensed as free software, and so guard against 
this form of opportunistic networking. Cooperation is encouraged because it is the 
glue that holds together the projects that yield the most socially useful innovations. 
Nonetheless, the norm of individual software freedom, legally secured by every FOSS 
licence, entails the recognition that each individual is at liberty to fork a project (to 
                                                 
18
 Permissive licensing strategies thereby seek to enlarge the information ‘commons’. As Yochai 
Benkler has explained, “the core characteristic of property as the institutional foundation of markets is 
that the allocation of power to decide how a resource will be used is systematically and drastically 
asymmetric. That asymmetry permits the existence of ‘an owner’ who can decide what to do, and with 
whom…. The salient characteristic of commons, as opposed to property, is that no single person has 
exclusive control over the use and disposition of any particular resource in the commons” (Benkler, 
2006, p.60-61). 
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take a project’s source code base and launch an incompatible project from it), and to 
distribute modified versions of project outputs which are compatible with earlier 
versions. These liberties enable project participants to depart a project in order to 
apply their skills elsewhere: they thereby preserve contributors’ mobility, an asset 
deemed especially necessary in case project leaders show themselves to be 
overbearing, uncommunicative or incompetent. Finally, attribution norms ensure that 
all contributions are accredited
19
 so that no one’s work goes unacknowledged.  
 
And yet however opposed to exploitative economic relations they may seem, these 
norms are now giving a solid shape to a spirit of post-Fordist capitalism that, on 
Boltanski and Chiapello’s own account, was only dimly discernible in the 
management discourses of the 1990s. From the mid-2000s on, this spirit has been 
elaborated in a business literature organized around the idea of an open and 
‘collaborative’ capitalism that relies on communication as the crucial source of 
wealth, but also on communication media that enable ‘everybody’ to contribute to 
wealth creation and share in its fruits (see e.g. Anderson, 2009; Grossman, 2006; 
Howe, 2008; Leadbetter, 2009; Shirky, 2008; Surowiecki, 2005; Tapscott & Williams 
2008). Two lessons – about the folly of hoarding and the wisdom of branding – are 
repeatedly expounded in this literature’s prescriptions for how (legitimate) wealth 
could be possible, now, for firms and individuals alike. Giving assets away for free, it 
is said, can generate more value than locking them up or pricing them – for example, 
where innovation in a firm’s ecosystem is sparked by doing so, thereby creating value 
for the firm,
20
 or where sharing can establish credentials and build goodwill with 
potential partners or customers (Tapscott & Williams, 2008, p.302-303). Yet the 
dominant view is that sharing should never displace, but should always complement, 
proprietary approaches: “the future of mass collaboration lies in hybrid models, in 
which participants share and appropriate at the same time” (ibid., p.303).21 Trends in 
the software sector are consistent with this view. Since the end of the 1990s, both free 
software and open source software development methods and projects have attracted 
steadily increasing interest from formerly wholly proprietary firms, notably IBM, Sun 
Microsystems, Novell, Oracle, Hewlett Packard and Nokia. To this day, commercial 
firms continue to support FOSS development by donations of money, legal advice, 
business consultancy services, training, equipment, code and staff time (see Berdou 
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 The social norm that prohibits the removal of a contributor’s name from a project’s credits list 
without his or her consent is reinforced by rules requiring contributors and project maintainers, 
respectively, to log every change made to a program and record the identities of those who wrote 
and/or revised each portion of a program. It is also underpinned by FOSS licences. All such licences 
provide that if the licensee distributes the licensed software, s/he must include with each copy a 
copyright notice: one effect of this is to ensure that credit accrues to the author(s) of the licensed 
software. Most FOSS licences also provide that if a licensee modifies the licensed software, s/he must 
ensure that the changes cannot be misattributed to the author of the original.  
20
 O’Mahony & Ferraro, 2007; Tapscott & Williams, 2008, p.315 (“[w]inning companies today have 
open and porous boundaries and compete by reaching outside their walls to harness external 
knowledge, resources, and capabilities. They’re like a hub for innovation and a magnet for uniquely 
qualified minds. They focus their internal staff on value integration and orchestration, and treat the 
world as their R&D department”). Accordingly, firms like Eli Lilly and Proctor & Gamble are now 
partnering with web-based enterprises such as InnoCentive, who claim to enable their clients to 
innovate faster and more cheaply by connecting them to ‘networks of millions of problem solvers’: see 
http://www.innocentive.com/  
21
 See also on this point, Benkler, 2006, p.122-127; Henkel, 2006; Fosfuri, Girratana, & Luzzi, 2008; 
Lerner & Schankerman, 2010. 
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2011, Ch.4-5). These donations are clearly motivated by strategic considerations. 
IBM’s support of the Linux project, for example, was prompted by its realization that 
the aggressively proprietary strategies on which it had previously relied had failed to 
produce an operating system that could disturb the market dominance of established 
rivals like Microsoft. Its investments in the project (a fraction of the cost of 
developing its own system) have enabled it to profit from sales of Linux-based 
services and hardware and undercut competitors who charge for operating system 
software.  
 
The same investments have also greatly improved IBM’s public image, because Linux 
is now a powerful brand as well as a formidable operating system. The centrality of 
conventional trademark rights to FOSS business models is readily understandable 
against this backdrop.
22
 Trademark rights are intellectual property rights subsisting in 
signs (names, logos and so on) that function as indicators of trade origin for the 
products to which they are applied. A trademark helps to position a product in a 
crowded marketplace (and media space), and so assists the process of building and 
maintaining a brand: its holder can prevent unauthorized traders from marketing their 
own products under the protected sign, thereby filching the holder’s goodwill. 
Significantly, even the Free Software Foundation has no objection in principle to the 
conventional exercise of trademark rights. FOSS project leaders and foundations 
frequently register trademarks with a view to coordinating the process of monetizing 
their projects’ reputations: these marks can be licensed (in return for royalties) to 
enterprises wishing to identify their goods and services with those projects (see e.g. 
Varghese, 2005).  
 
The perception that the most important currency within the FOSS universe is 
reputational capital in turn enables an interpretation of the hacker norms that organise 
FOSS development as oriented towards nothing other than structuring the competitive 
struggle to acquire it. It is by reference to the imperative to accumulate reputational 
capital that Eric Raymond, for example, resolves the apparent contradiction between 
his picture of the FOSS project owner as a kind of yeoman homesteader and the 
hacker norm that project owners should act as stewards of ‘their’ property for the 
project’s contributors. For Raymond, this norm makes sense because contributors’ 
investments in a project give them a stake in it as well: at stake for them are the 
“reputation returns” (Raymond, 2001b, p.103) yielded by their efforts. The strong 
social pressure against forking projects can, he argues, be explained in these terms 
(ibid., p.73), as also can the widespread recognition within developer communities 
that products emerging from forks should be distributed under a different name so that 
they are distinguishable from the parent version: illegitimately forking a project, and 
publicly distributing unauthorized modified versions of it that purport to be authorized 
versions, attract condemnation because they expose both the project owners and its 
individual contributors to the risk of reputational damage. On Raymond’s reading, 
then, the FOSS ethos – notwithstanding that it appears to reject property – is itself 
oriented towards the propertization (albeit informal) of an intangible asset: not code 
but reputation, both collective and individual.  
 
                                                 
22
 For a prescient early analysis of how, already in the 1990s, a regime of cultural rights organized by 
reference to copyright and original authorship was being displaced by one underpinned by trademarks 
and branding, see Lury, 1993. 
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Brand equity has become a significant source of shareholder value since the 1990s, as 
digital ICTs both increased global information flows and enabled financialization to 
drive economic growth (Willmott, 2010); and business analysts generally have 
become attuned to branding’s growing importance. To these observers, Raymond’s 
reading is apt to suggest that the true secret of FOSS enterprises’ success in attracting 
and retaining expert volunteers is attribution. Attribution can be seen as incentivizing 
creativity, partly because of the psychic benefits that recognition brings, and partly 
because it facilitates mobility: by “signalling human capital” (Fisk, 2006, p.53), 
countable credits reduce employers’ search costs in contexts of rapid labour turnover 
and thereby enable their recipients to find their way into (better) paid employment. So 
if one key lesson taught by free software activists’ social critique of capitalism is that 
valuable outputs should be shared even with those who have not paid for them, the 
other is that valuable inputs can be harvested even from those who have not been paid 
for them if the latter are offered routes to profitable self-commodification: equipped 
with a portfolio of “braggables [they] can take credit for” (Peters, 1997; see also 
Botsman, 2012), contributors can counteract structural economic insecurity by 
monetizing their own human capital. 
 
 
4 New Economy; New Critiques 
 
It follows from the foregoing that the distinctions to which the mythology of FOSS 
appeals – between exclusivity and openness, the sale and the gift, the proprietary and 
the non-proprietary – are blurred in practice. Not only are ‘proprietary’ commercial 
enterprises increasingly resorting to ‘non-proprietary’ strategies, but exclusivity in 
some form – if not via the copyrights in software, then via the trademarks under 
which FOSS products and services are sold and the credits by which individual 
developers track and measure their achievements and market their reputations – 
underpins profitability across the board. Whether the norms embedded in FOSS 
production practices can continue to be associated with legitimate profit-creation – 
and so remain as the ethical foundation of contemporary capitalism – is however an 
open question. A paradox can be discerned here which can be simply stated. On the 
one hand, it is not at all clear that FOSS licensing regimes are robust enough either to 
sustain the enterprises that have been built around them, or to institutionalize the 
norms that constitute the hacker ethos. On the other hand, if they do turn out to be 
capable of yielding the requisite degree of commercial certainty in the long term, 
renewals of the social and artistic critiques of capitalism will inevitably be prompted 
by FOSS business models themselves. 
 
Questions abound, first of all, as to the legal status of FOSS licences. How should 
they be characterized in relation to the available legal categories of licence? In what 
circumstances, if at all, can they be revoked? Is the viral effect of copyleft clauses 
legally enforceable, and if so, on what doctrinal basis? What law applies to these 
licences in a context where users could be based in multiple jurisdictions? What legal 
implications follow from distributing products whose elements have been licensed 
under incompatible licences? What legal and commercial implications follow from 
the disclaimers of warranty and limitations of remedy contained in most FOSS 
licences? The lack of clarity regarding these and other fundamental issues (see e.g. 
Hass, 2007; McGowan, 2001; Nadan, 2002; Narodick, 2010; Pallas Loren, 2007) 
reveals the essential fragility of the licensing strategies peculiar to FOSS 
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communities. To a large extent, in fact, the commercialization of FOSS has proceeded 
on the basis of a series of gentlemen’s agreements and tacit understandings. If these 
were to unravel, FOSS licences could play no significant role in structuring the 
software economy thereafter. Similar uncertainties bedevil their ‘free culture’ 
analogues (such as Creative Commons licences) albeit to a lesser extent (Dusollier 
2007). 
 
Even assuming that they are legally valid, open licences (FOSS licences and their 
derivatives) have significant limitations as mechanisms for institutionalizing the more 
striking features of the hacker ethos. Concretizing only the individual freedoms to use 
and modify licensed material and distribute copies and modified versions, they cannot 
be deployed to enforce the other-regarding hacker norms of sharing and cooperation.
23
 
So although these latter norms could potentially serve as resources for challenging 
opportunistic profit-seeking, they lack a firm institutional underpinning. Meanwhile, 
the liberties granted to users by open licences are real, but paradoxical. As liberties, 
they carry no restrictions on the functional goals towards which users may choose to 
direct the further development of licensed material – goals that could be freedom-
denying in other ways.
24
 At the same time, copyleft licences – requiring those 
licensees who do choose to share their modified versions to share alike – have been 
aptly characterized as imposing ‘servitudes’ (Shaffer Van Houweling, 2008) on users, 
obligations that ‘run with’ the licensed object as it moves from one user to another 
(Radin, 2000, p.1132–1133).25 The terms of an open licence are physically encoded in 
the digitized object itself, so that the latter’s conditions of use (together with other 
details, such as attribution information) move with it as it circulates online; when a 
new user encounters the object, the embedded code automatically indicates the 
applicable terms. In so far as they thereby mark digitized information products with 
servitude-type restrictions that bind users even though consent to them is effectively 
absent, copyleft licences are no different from the über-copyright end-user licences 
resorted to by the most aggressively profit-seeking firms in the information 
industries.
26
 In other words, the same technique that uses copyright to limit copyright 
is also being used to make it broader, e.g. by means of ‘running’ pre-emptions of 
                                                 
23
 Even GPL-based licences impose no positive obligation on licensees to distribute any derivative 
products they make using the licensed software; nor do they require such derivatives actively to 
contribute to the advance of any FOSS project in which the author of the licensed software is already 
involved. 
24
 Chopra and Dexter note, for example, that the GPL does not prevent the inclusion of privacy-
violating code in software acquired under a GPL-based licence (Chopra & Dexter, 2008, p.45).  
25
 See e.g. GPL Cl. 10 (providing that “[e]ach time you convey a covered work, the recipient 
automatically receives a license from the original licensors, to run, modify and propagate that work, 
subject to this License”). 
26
 For a history of proprietary software licences and an account of the factors that led to the inclusion of 
servitudes within the system of software distribution under licences, see Hemnes, 2004. Recent US and 
EU jurisprudence validates recourse to licensing strategies oriented towards restricting the licensee’s 
ability to transfer and use licensed software: see e.g. Vernor v Autodesk, 621 F. 3d 1102 (9th Cir. 
September 10, 2010), cert. denied 132 S. Ct 105 (2011); cf. UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle Int’l Corp, 
(Case C-128/11) (Court of Justice of the European Union, 3 July 2012) (disallowing transfer 
restrictions where the licensee has paid a royalty commensurate with the economic value of the 
licensed copy of the program, but acknowledging that the licence continues to determine the use to 
which the transferee may put the software after transfer).  
20 
 
important defences to copyright infringement (ibid., p.1133).
27
 Further, the technique 
cannot be legally valid in one context without also being valid in the other; and in 
either case validity will, of legal necessity, depend on licence terms being readable as 
delivering economic benefits to licensors considered as utility-maximizing rational 
actors.
28
 Copyleft licensing is thus parasitic on the very licensing model that the FOSS 
movement was set up to oppose (Madison, 2004; Narodick, 2010) – a licensing model 
that is, moreover, crucial to the information industries’ overarching strategy at 
present: to track and monetize every move made in lives increasingly lived online, 
and to achieve this dominion by means of legal rules that are formulated privately, 
and applied and enforced by automated technical systems that are privately designed.  
 
Clearly, FOSS licensing is oriented towards a radically different goal than that of 
proprietary licensing regimes: not profit-maximization through the global enclosure of 
the common, but the global common good through the construction of a global 
software commons. It is for this reason that the free software movement too seeks to 
route around the States and international organizations that enact public copyright 
laws, anchoring the hacker ethos instead in made-to-measure software freedom codes 
that have been engineered from the bottom up by hacker communities. The guiding 
idea is to mobilize the power of open networks against those forces that currently aim 
to propertize them and the content flowing through them: to pit a transnational hacker 
movement against an enclosure movement that is similarly indifferent to national 
boundaries and state-political accountability (on this see Dusollier, 2007). Yet this is 
to endorse the use of under-the-radar techniques of governance to regulate public 
access to and use of software and networks – techniques that, as shown above, can 
just as easily be used to achieve contrary goals. And since ultimately the 
enforceability of FOSS licences depends on national courts and national laws, the 
notion that this movement could trump the state-political instance through the 
spontaneous self-generation of a normative order ‘beyond’ the state is arguably 
illusory (Marrella & Yoo, 2007; cf. Teubner, 2004). 
 
Assuming, however, that the legal and commercial uncertainties associated with free 
licences can be overcome, two further sources of instability in the ethical foundations 
of the new economy are foreseeable. The first emerges from the fact that FOSS-based 
business models are beginning to appear at least as exploitative as those associated 
with closed source software. If “[t]he networker has succeeded when, at the end of a 
project, something [not produced by him] can be attributed to him and publicly 
associated with his name” (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005, p.359) then the activities of 
enterprises that commercialize FOSS outputs arguably qualify as paradigm cases of 
the form of exploitation specific to network capitalism. Yet by sharing their work 
under FOSS licences, volunteer developers relinquish the sole leverage that they 
would otherwise have against such firms: the power to veto the commercial use of the 
                                                 
27
 For an important analysis of the affinities between proprietary and open licensing, see Elkin-Koren, 
2005. 
28
 Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Here a senior US Court ruled that the re-use of 
code from a program licensed under an open source licence was a breach of copyright because the 
licence conditions – notably those relating to attribution and the logging of modifications – had not 
been complied with. Although US copyright law does not in general give authors attribution rights, the 
licence effectively did, but only because its conditions were adjudged to be calculated to deliver 
economic benefits to the licensor by drawing attention to his project (ibid., p. 1379, 1382). See further 
Zhu (in press).  
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licensed code. So far, few FOSS activists have foregrounded this as a problem. It is 
deeply embedded in the philosophy of both the free software and open source 
branches of the movement that those who distribute FOSS products should be 
encouraged “to charge as much as they wish or can” (Stallman, 2010, p.65). The 
pursuit of profit by this means is seen as a “good and legitimate activity” (ibid.) and 
there is no norm requiring that contributors receive remuneration, although the FSF 
encourages distributors to donate some of their profits to it or to other free software 
development projects. The concern that some consumers might be priced out of the 
market for distributions is recognized as valid, but is countered by the argument that – 
FOSS being what it is – users who cannot afford the price demanded by a particular 
distributor will always be able to acquire the software from some other source for a 
price at or near zero (although software unaccompanied by the high-quality technical 
support typically provided by distributors is effectively only useable by adepts.)  
 
Few FOSS developers harbour personal objections to the commercialization of 
products incorporating their own unpaid labour. Yet if reputational incentives are as 
powerful in the FOSS universe as has been suggested, these same developers also 
imagine that their chances of (better) paid employment will increase on the strength of 
high quality FOSS project work that can be attributed to them. In fact, the availability 
to software firms of pools of expert volunteer labour is highly likely to exert a 
downward pressure on wages and worsen conditions of employment for programmers 
generally (Söderberg, 2008, p.40), and firms’ recourse to open source licensing can 
lessen the mobility of their own employees.
29
 Likewise, the circulation of zero-priced 
software products alongside equivalent products that are available for a price on the 
software market may seem to benefit consumers, but its effect on the market for 
programming labour can only be deleterious for programmers – and ultimately for 
FOSS communities, whose members rely on the wages they can earn as programmers 
to subsidize the FOSS work they undertake in their spare time (ibid.). In short, it is 
difficult to find in the legal and ethical norms governing FOSS development and 
commercialization adequate guarantees of security for those producers whose 
participation is required to sustain the business models that FOSS has inspired. The 
same can be said of other contexts to which these norms have been ‘ported’. In the 
cultural industries, too, free or under-compensated creative labour is increasingly 
being enlisted in ways analogous to the mobilisation of volunteer programming 
expertise in the software sector,
30
 and the precariousness of cultural workers is 
arguably being intensified thereby. A revival of the social critique, exposing 
contradictions in the values of sharing, collaboration and equality to which the new 
spirit of capitalism appeals, therefore seems timely; indeed it is already underway (see 
e.g. Burston, Dyer-Witheford, & Hearn 2010; Scholz, 2013). 
 
A second source of likely future upheaval in the new (software) economy is that 
FOSS projects preserve rather less room for authentic human relations, spontaneous 
self-organization and creative work than the mythologizing would suggest. 
                                                 
29
 Chopra and Dexter note that firms’ strategic use of open source licensing can be a means of 
undercutting any bargaining power that might otherwise accrue to employed developers from their 
capacity to depart the firm, taking their specialized knowledge with them, before their employers can 
fully extract all the value generated by their work (Chopra & Dexter, 2008:22). 
30
 The remix contests now routinely organised on behalf of record companies are exemplary: see e.g. 
http://findremix.com/about/  
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Commercial enterprises can annex and manipulate FOSS projects in which they 
become involved. Donations of staff time in particular can help to position FOSS 
developer communities as a firm’s ‘complementary’ (as distinct from its core) assets: 
when employees can gain access to these communities, they can influence the 
direction of project development and legitimize the firm’s commercial exploitation of 
project outputs (Dahlander & Wallin, 2006; Fosfuri et al., 2008). The popular image 
of networked innovation as proceeding from an undifferentiated ‘hive mind’ is also in 
tension with the realities of project governance, which as indicated in Part 1 tends to 
further disintegrate the fragmented labour processes, and mimic the (property- and 
expertise-based) power structures, characteristic of the post-Fordist enterprise;
31
 
invariably, too, these structures reflect multiple intersecting social inequalities
32
 and 
often they are held together by a form of charismatic domination (Dafermos, 2012) 
that is difficult to square with the artistic critique’s gospel of liberation. Most 
importantly, the premium placed on the competitive pursuit of ‘reputation returns’ is 
at the very least in tension with the hacker spirit’s privileging of creativity and 
community. In a reputational economy, creative production becomes a means to the 
end of forging a publicly recognizable identity: the goal is not so much to produce a 
body of work that can take on an existence beyond oneself as to become an 
entrepreneur of one’s self by associating as much activity as possible (preferably 
including that of others) with one’s name. If unchecked, this will yield a culture in 
which (self-)promotion takes priority over production; it is also liable to obscure the 
collective effort that sustains every project, erode mutual trust and loyalty, and 
ultimately undermine the FOSS spirit itself. A revival of the artistic critique, exposing 
how ideals of autonomy, authenticity and mutual recognition are simultaneously 
invoked and betrayed in the (brand) new economy, therefore also seems timely; and it 
too is underway (see e.g. Arvidsson, 2009; Arvidsson & Colleoni, 2012; Fleming, 
2009; Hearn, 2008, 2010; Lair, Sullivan, & Cheney, 2005; Willmott, 2010; Zwick, 
Bonsu, & Darmody, 2008). 
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